Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity, and Character Development by Boeker, Ruth
 1 
Shaftesbury on Persons, Personal Identity and Character Development 
 
Ruth Boeker 
University College Dublin 
 
Penultimate version. Please cite published version. 
 
Published in Philosophy Compass 13/1 (2018): e12471 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/phc3.12471  
 
 
ABSTRACT  
Shaftesbury’s major work Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times was one of the most 
influential English works in the eighteenth century. This paper focuses on his contributions 
to debates about persons and personal identity and shows that Shaftesbury regards 
metaphysical questions of personal identity as closely connected with normative questions of 
character development. I argue that he is willing to accept that persons are substances and 
that he takes their continued existence for granted. He sees the need to supplement 
metaphysical debates of personal identity and believes that we have to turn to the character 
that is realized by a substance if we want to understand who we are. For Shaftesbury persons 
have a particular character, can act, and govern themselves. I propose that Shaftesbury’s 
approach to persons has a developmental dimension, which is meant to encourage personal 
development and improvement of character. The developmental dimension can be 
understood as an intellectual journey that invites us to search for our true self, to develop our 
character, and to seek happiness, which ultimately involves understanding our place as 
persons in the order of the universe. I show that my developmental interpretation is 
preferable to other existing interpretations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The works of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, were enormously 
influential in eighteenth century Britain.1 His Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times is 
a collection of his mature works, which was “first published in 1711, [and] was [besides 
Locke’s Two Treatises] “the most reprinted book in English in that century.”2 Yet more 
research needs to be done to rediscover Shaftesbury’s philosophical significance. For 
Shaftesbury philosophy is meant to “to refine our Spirits, improve our Understandings, or 
mend our Manners.” (S III.1, 1:179; C 129) He emphasizes that philosophy should have an 
ethical or practical dimension, it should guide our intellectual and moral development, and 
thereby our search for happiness and the good.3 In a passage that nicely summarizes the 
central themes of his philosophy, he states:  
 
To philosophize, in a just Signification, is but to carry Good-breeding a step higher. For the 
Accomplishment of Breeding is, To learn whatever is decent in Company, or beautiful in 
Arts; and the Sum of Philosophy is, To learn what is just in Society, and beautiful in Nature, 
and the Order of the World. (MR III.1, 3:99; C 407) 
 
In this paper I will focus on Shaftesbury’s contributions to debates about persons and 
personal identity and we will see how his moral views shape his thinking about persons and 
personal identity. Moreover, we will see that personal development culminates in 
understanding the order of the world and our place in it.  
																																																						
1 More information about Shaftesbury’s life and works can be found in Gill (2016a); Klein 
(2004); McAteer (2011); Milton (2010); Yaffe (2002).  
2 den Uyl (2001, vii). References to Characteristicks are to Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl 
of Shaftesbury (2001), Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. D. den Uyl 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund), 3 vols., hereafter “Characteristicks.” Additionally references to the 
passages in Shaftesbury (1999), Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions Times, ed. L. E. Klein 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) will be given. Characteristicks is a collection of 
Shaftesbury’s mature works. Individual works of the collection will be abbreviated and cited 
as follows: 
S: Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author 
M: The Moralists: A Philosophical Rhapsody 
MR: Miscellaneous Reflections on the said Treatises, and other critical Subjects 
C: Klein’s edition of Characteristics. 
3 For further discussion see Gill (2016a); Purviance (2004); Winkler (2000). 
 3 
Shaftesbury’s remarks about persons and personal identity are scattered throughout his 
works.4 Within Characteristicks we find relevant remarks in Soliloquy, The Moralists, and 
Miscellaneous Reflections. Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author is written as an inner dialogue; it literally 
addresses authors, but metaphorically it is an invitation to everyone to improve their 
character and manners. The Moralists, a Philosophical Rhapsody is a dialogue, narrated from the 
perspective of Philocles. In the passages relevant for our purposes Philocles interacts with 
Theocles and both dialogue partners are devoted to the search of happiness and the good. 
Theocles is portrayed as a highly educated, intellectual genius, who devotes his life to the 
study of the arts, culture and morality.5 In contrast to Theocles, Philocles takes a sceptical 
stance, and often brings the dialogue back down to earth. Miscellaneous Reflections was originally 
published as volume 3 of the three volumes edition of Characteristicks and contains reflections 
on the philosophical ideas developed in the first two volumes.  
One challenge that every interpreter of Shaftesbury faces is that Shaftesbury’s discussion 
of persons and personal identity is scattered throughout Characteristicks, often developed in 
dialogue form, both inner and proper dialogues, and the proposed notions of self or person 
tend to be challenged as the dialogue progresses. This makes it hard to identify Shaftesbury’s 
considered views. Instead of treating this as a limitation of Shaftesbury’s view, I believe that 
interpreters still have to fully appreciate the developmental dimension of Shaftesbury’s 
discussion. His philosophy is meant to be practical and to encourage personal improvement 
and character development. He would regard traditional metaphysical approaches that aim to 
specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity as limited and static, 
because they do not help us to improve our lives. Shaftesbury’s discussion of persons and 
personal identity goes beyond the metaphysical project, though—as we will see—does not 
entirely eliminate it either. I want to propose that his approach involves a developmental 
dimension and that through the dialogue form Shaftesbury invites his readers to be part of an 
intellectual journey—a journey that invites us to search for our true self, to develop our 
character, to seek happiness, which for Shaftesbury—speaking through the voice of 
Theocles—involves understanding our place as persons in the order of the universe (section 
2). Next I will outline existing interpretations in the literature and argue why my 
interpretation is preferable (section 3). I will end by reflecting on the significance of 
Shaftesbury’s contributions to debates about persons and personal identity (section 4). 
																																																						
4 Relevant texts and passages include S I.1–2, III.1; C 70-85, 125–135; M II.1, II.4, III.1; C 
247–257, 272–288, 296–316; MR IV; C 419–433. See also Shaftesbury (1900). 
5 See Shaftesbury, M II.1, 2:126; C 248. See also Gill (2010). 
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2. Shaftesbury’s developmental approach to persons  
 
Let us examine more closely the developmental dimension of Shaftesbury’s approach to 
persons. Personal development is not something static. It is not a fixed state, in which one 
either is or is not. Rather it is an ongoing process that takes place over time and can involve 
several phases. The individual phases help us to progress in our personal development, or 
they enable us to look from new perspectives at questions such as who we really are and how 
we can improve our character and lives. As we progress from one phase to another we come 
a step closer towards realizing our true self. When I speak of the developmental dimension of 
Shaftesbury’s approach to persons I mean a gradual process that enables personal growth and 
development and aims at the realization of one’s true self. I will show in the following that a 
developmental dimension in this sense can be found in Shaftesbury’s philosophy. 
Although Shaftesbury does not explicitly use the language of “phases” I believe that this 
term provides a helpful tool to reconstruct how various passages in which he speaks about 
self, persons and personal identity, and which at first appear unconnected, can be integrated 
into a coherent view about personal development.6 In the following I will outline one possible 
sequence of phases that a Shaftesburean approach to personal development could have. Let 
me emphasize that the order is one among many possible sequences. All of the conceptions 
of self that I present in the following are discussed by Shaftesbury throughout Characteristicks, 
but there is no single text that presents all of them, let alone in the order in which I present 
them.  
Before I turn to Shaftesbury’s positive proposals, I want to put aside the views that he 
criticizes. He rejects bodily views of personal identity. Matter constantly changes and any 
theory in terms of matter or bodily appearances would not have the constancy that we 
assume a self or person to have.7  
																																																						
6	Shaftesbury does not explicitly distinguish the terms ‘person,’ ‘human being,’ ‘self,’ and 
‘soul,’ but he also does not equate all of them and argues that there can be two souls/persons 
in a human being/self. Relevant passages include the following: “I have in reality within me 
two distinct separate Souls” (S I.2, 1:115; C 83), “our doctrine of Two Persons in one individual 
Self” (S I.2, 1:115; C 83) Note, though, that he also speaks of a “natural SELF,” a “better SELF,” 
or “nobler Self,” and “[o]ur real and genuine SELF” (S III.1, 1:174–175; C 126), which suggests 
that he does not sharply distinguish the terms ‘person’ and ‘self.’ In the following I use the 
terms ‘self’ and ‘person’ interchangeably.	
7 See Shaftesbury, S III.1, 1:176; C 127; M II.1, 2:143, III.1, 2:196–197; C 254, 300–301. 
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He regards Descartes’s famous cogito—the claim that I exist while I am thinking—as trivial 
and uninformative. According to Shaftesbury, Descartes does not properly address the 
important questions, namely “the Question is, “What constitutes the WE or I?” And, 
“Whether the I of this instant, be the same with that of any instant preceding or to come.”’’ 
(MR IV.1, 3:118; C 420). 
Furthermore, Shaftesbury offers several arguments to show that memory or 
consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity, which target Lockean 
views of personal identity.8 It is not necessary, Shaftesbury argues, because persons can 
continue to exist and continue to be concerned in their past or future even if they have lost 
memories of their previous thoughts or actions.9 Additionally, Shaftesbury argues that 
memory is not sufficient for personal identity. One reason he offers is that memory can be 
false.10 A second reason concerns an example of someone who during travel in foreign 
countries radically changed their character, but can still remember their former experiences, 
beliefs, and values.11 Shaftesbury’s negative arguments reveal that he assumes personal 
identity to have a certain stability that cannot be found in fleeting matter or fleeting 
psychological states. 
We are now ready to turn to Shaftesbury’s positive views and give a reconstruction of the 
different phases of personal development. In light of his arguments that a person can 
continue to exist despite changes of outer bodily appearance, it is plausible that we have to 
turn inward.  
You have probably been in situations where inner voices pull you in different directions. 
For instance, part of you may want to stay in bed all day and watch movies, while another 
part reminds you of your long-term higher goals and convinces you that it is important to get 
																																																						
8 For a more detailed discussion see Thiel (2011, 177–180) and Winkler (2000, 6–8). Locke 
(1975) in chapter xxvii of Book II of his An Essay concerning Human Understanding argues that 
personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness. Many Locke scholars agree that 
Locke’s notion of sameness of consciousness cannot be reduced to memory; they include 
Atherton (1983); Matthews (1977); Strawson (2011); Thiel (2011); Weinberg (2016). Stuart 
(2013) is an exception. Thiel (2011) criticizes Shaftesbury for failing to properly “grasp 
Locke’s distinctions between consciousness and memory and between man and person” 
(177–178). Thiel’s observation is correct, but I doubt that Shaftesbury would have entirely 
retracted his arguments had he better understood the nuances of Locke’s view, because 
Shaftesbury’s arguments do not replace a memory view of personal identity with a more 
sophisticated view of consciousness, but rather are grounded in Shaftesbury’s moral views 
and tend to emphasize the importance developing a stable character. 
9 See Shaftesbury, M II.1, 2:133–134; C 253–254.  
10 See Shaftesbury, MR IV.1, 118; C420–421.  
11 See Shaftesbury, S III.1, 1:176; C 127. We will return to the example and consider it more 
closely in the following. 
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up and study to reach long-term happiness. Shaftesbury believes that it is important to 
acquire self-knowledge as it can help improve our manners. For instance, if you start to 
examine what inner desires or inclinations explain your struggle to get out of bed, you can use 
these insights to change your manners. As Shaftesbury emphasizes in Soliloquy, self-knowledge 
is fundamental for any other inquiry. Following ancient philosophers, he encourages his 
readers to turn inward with the aim of discovering their true self: 
 
This was among the Antients, that celebrated Delphick Inscription, RECOGNIZE YOUR-
SELF: which was as much as to say, Divide your-self or Be TWO. For if the Division were 
rightly made, all within wou’d, of course, they thought, be rightly understood, and 
prudently manag’d. Such Confidence they had in this Home-Dialect of SOLILOQUY. (S I.2, 
1:107; C 77) 
 
Shaftesbury believes that when we properly introspect and reflect on who we are, we will 
realize that there are two persons within one human being. He uses the metaphor of surgery 
to illustrate the relation between the two persons: one is patient and the other agent. We can 
also think of the relation between the two persons in analogy to the relation between pupil 
and teacher, or between advisee and advisor.12 According to Shaftesbury, the better or nobler 
self, which is one of the persons within ourselves, has a certain authority and is meant to 
guide the other base or lower self.13 Let us call this inward directed, introspective self-
examination the first phase of a Shaftesburean search for self. 
One reason why Shaftesbury criticized Cartesian views is that they do not properly engage 
with the question of what constitutes a person. In phase one this question has not yet been 
addressed and hence the search needs to continue and offer a further positive 
characterization of the constitution of a person. Shaftesbury invites us to consider the 
changes that a close and intimate friend could undergo while sick and travelling in foreign 
countries. On the one hand, he acknowledges that there could be outer changes of bodily 
appearances, but he argues that a person can endure such changes.14 On the other hand, there 
can be inner alterations of beliefs, characters, and manners and if they radically change then—
so Shaftesbury suggests—a person is not any longer the same, even if they are still able to 
remember their former experiences. 
																																																						
12 See Shaftesbury, S I.1, 1:97–100 I.2, 1:106–107; C 70–72, 77. 
13 See Shaftesbury, S I.2, 1:106; C 77. 
14 See Shaftesbury, S III.1, 176; C 127. 
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But shou’d a like Face and Figure of a Friend return to us with Thoughts and Humours of 
a strange and foreign Turn, with Passions, Affections, and Opinions wholly different 
from any thing we had formerly known; we shou’d say in earnest, and with the greatest 
Amazement and Concern, that this was another Creature, and not the Friend whom we once 
knew familiarly. Nor shou’d we in reality attempt any renewal of Acquaintance or 
Correspondence with such a Person, though perhaps he might preserve his Memory the 
faint Marks or Tokens of former Transactions which had pass’d between us. (S III.1, 
1:176; C 127) 
 
First, Shaftesbury here makes an epistemological point that it would be difficult to 
recognize a former friend after they have radically changed their character. Additionally, he 
seems to draw a metaphysical conclusion, namely that “this was another Creature.” The insight 
that we gain during this second phase is that a person should be identified, epistemically, and 
arguably also metaphysically, with a stable character. Yet it is worth noting that it is not clear 
how far Shaftesbury wants to take these conclusions. As the text continues he reminds us 
how little we know about ourselves and writes:15 
 
When a Revolution of this kind, tho not so total, happens at any time in a Character; 
when the Passion or Humour of a known Person changes remarkably from what it once 
was; ’tis to Philosophy we then appeal. (S III.1, 1:176; C 127)   
 
Let us pause to consider the worry that phases one and two can be in tension with each 
other. If we take seriously that a person will not any longer be the same person after radical 
changes of character, then one may worry that this proposal undermines the efforts of phase 
one, which presupposes that the base or lower self has the possibility of changing their 
character. Does this apparent tension undermine Shaftesbury’s project? I do not think so. 
Instead it can reinforce how important it is that the base self listens to the better self and aims 
to approximate the better self. Only if the base self approximates the better self can others 
encounter our better character. Since the base self will have more stability when it 
approximates the better self, we have a further incentive for taking the guidance of the better 
																																																						
15 Further discussion of the role of self-knowledge in Shaftesbury can be found in Renz 
(2017). 
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self seriously, as this will likely make friendships more stable and prevent scenarios such as 
the one described in the story of the traveller.  
Having suggested that a person is identified with a stable character, the question remains 
whether it is important to cultivate a particular character. This question is the focus of a third 
phase. For Shaftesbury the cultivation and development of character is intimately tied to his 
larger philosophical project, namely, the search for happiness and the good. In The Moralists 
Part II, section 1, the friends Philocles and Theocles meet in the country and their path is 
devoted to the search for happiness. Theocles proposes ““That Nothing can be good but what is 
constant”” (M II.1, 2:128; C 249) and claims that we can find greatest stability in genuine 
continued friendship:  
 
this Pleasure [of friendship] is more debauching than any other. Never did any Soul do 
good, but it came readier to do the same again, with more Enjoyment. Never was Love, 
or Gratitude, or Bounty practis’d but with increasing Joy, which made the Practiser still 
more in love with the fair Act. (M II.1, 2:135; C 254) 
 
Genuine friendship, as Theocles understands it, is love of humanity; it is not the love of a 
particular individual, but rather love of mankind.16  
How is pursuit of happiness and the good related to our search for self? We would not be 
able to acquire true happiness, if we lacked the virtues of a true friend of humanity. In so far 
as we aim to become a person that lives an intellectually satisfying and good life, it will not be 
sufficient to have any stable character, but rather it will be important to develop the character 
of a genuine friend. 
However, are we able to be friends of humanity? Philocles intervenes and worries that it is 
too demanding to love humanity in the abstract and beyond the capacities of the ordinary 
person: 
 
I told THEOCLES, going along, that I fear’d I shou’d never make a good Friend or Lover 
after his way. As for a plain natural Love of one single person in either Sex, I cou’d compass 
it, I thought, well enough; but this complex universal sort was beyond my reach. I cou’d love 
the Individual, but not the Species. This was too mysterious; too metaphysical an Object 
for me. In short, I cou’d love nothing of which I had not some sensible material Image. 
(M II.1, 2:137; C 256) 
																																																						
16 See Shaftesbury, M II.1, 2:127–139; C 249–257. 
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Philocles’s doubts invite us to enter a fourth phase where we step back from abstract and 
highly intellectual reflections and return to wordly interactions with individual persons, whom 
we can meet, see, hear, touch, and whose company we can enjoy. Philocles’s struggle to 
follow Theocles’s proposal illustrates how far removed the position that Theocles aspires to is 
from ordinary experience. Indeed, it seems inaccessible to most people. Theocles belongs to a 
small elite circle of upper class gentlemen, which only those who had the privilege to enjoy 
the finest education can enter.17 Philocles’s doubts make explicit that many people lack the 
intellectual resources that equip them for highly abstract love of humanity. They also show us 
how hard and intellectually demanding it can be to devote one’s life to happiness and 
character development and to fully realize one’s true self.  
Nevertheless, Theocles and Philocles are not yet drawn back to ordinary life and continue 
their intellectual journey. In a fifth phase, guided by Theocles, we enter theoretical and 
cosmological reflections on the self of the universe.18 As mentioned above, for Shaftesbury 
one of the aims of philosophy is to understand the order of the world19 and he develops this 
point in the following reflections between Theocles and Philocles.  
Theocles suggests that the order, unity, and coherence in nature presuppose an underlying 
system or whole. After reflections on the identity of trees, the two friends start to wonder 
whether there is a genuine boundary between different persons, say between you and me, or 
whether we are all part of one universe.20 According to Theocles, “there is a strange Simplicity 
in this YOU and ME, that in reality they shou’d still be one and the same, when neither one Atom 
of Body, one Passion, nor one Thought remains the same.” (M III.1, 2:197; C301) Modes or 
accidents cannot explain the simplicity and, hence, both take for granted that persons are 
substances, though Philocles adds: “But for anything further relating to this Question, you 
know my Sceptick Principles: I determine neither way.” (M III.1, 2:198; C 302). Individual 
minds are fascinating systems; they enable us to think, imagine and act. Could it be a matter 
of pure chance that there are many individual intelligent systems (or individual selves) or are 
they all part of a larger system? Theocles is convinced that there is a larger whole, or a self of 
nature, and that individual selves are “copy’d from another principal and original SELF (the 
Great-one of the World)” (M III.1, 2:201; C 304). Similarly as a human mind creates order and 
unity and governs different parts of the human body, the universal mind of the world creates 
																																																						
17 See Gill (2010, 20). 
18 See Shaftesbury, M II.4, III.1; C 272–288, 296–316. 
19 See Shaftesbury, MR III.1, 3:99; C 407.  
20 See Shaftesbury, M III.1, 2:195–201; C 299–304.  
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unity and order in nature and among individual selves. This insight leads us to “endeavour to 
be really one with [the self of the world], and conformable with it, as far as [we are] able.” (M 
III.1, 2:201; C 304) Once we understand our place in the order of the universe, a “particular 
MIND should seek its Happiness in conformity with the general-one, and endeavour to resemble 
it in its highest Simplicity and Excellence.” (M III.1, 2:201; C304) 
Then the dialogue turns to other topics and ends abruptly: “BY this time we found our-
selves insensibly got home. Our Philosophy ended and we return’d to common Affairs of Life.” 
(M III.3, 2:247; C 338)21 This concluding remark of The Moralists can be seen as further 
recognition that the elite intellectual views advocated by Theocles are far removed from 
ordinary life.  
 
 
3. Interpretive questions revisited 
 
Having suggested that Shaftesbury’s approach to persons has a developmental dimension, it is 
time to consider how the interpretation that I have given above can supplement existing 
interpretations and help answer problems raised in the literature. Here I will focus on the 
following questions that have been raised by interpreters of Shaftesbury’s account of persons 
and personal identity: 
 
(i) To what extent is Shaftesbury’s approach to persons and personal identity ethical 
or practical, and to what extent is it metaphysical? 
(ii) Does Shaftesbury make contributions to the traditional problem of personal 
identity? 
(iii) Are questions of character development connected with questions of personal 
identity, or are these separate issues? 
 
Although there is relatively little discussion of Shaftesbury’s approach to persons and 
personal identity in the secondary literature, a few prominent and rather different 
interpretations have emerged and it is worth outlining their key contributions. 
Susan Purviance (2004, 2006) argues that Shaftesbury offers a “moral, not metaphysical” 
(2004, 161; 2006, 58) approach to self. She takes seriously that for Shaftesbury philosophy is 
meant to be practical and emphasizes that a self’s struggle of achieving unity is an ongoing 
																																																						
21 For further discussion see Gill (2016b).  
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project of life that aims at personal integrity. Shaftesbury’s Soliloquy is an important source for 
Purviance’s interpretation. She draws particularly on the views that Shaftesbury develops 
during phase one of my reconstruction above. According to Purviance, the dialogic nature of 
Shaftesbury’s approach to self is significant, because the inner dialogue enables us to resolve 
tensions and thereby strive towards personal integrity. It is often acknowledged that accounts 
of personal identity involve a unity relation that creates unity at a time and over time. The 
interesting feature of Purviance’s interpretation is her proposal to understand the unity 
relation in terms of integrity. 
Kenneth Winkler (2000) also emphasizes the practical or ethical dimension of 
Shaftesbury’s approach to self. According to Winkler, “Shaftesbury [is] a critic of Locke 
inclined to locate personal identity not in the understanding, but in the will.” (5) The will is a 
seat of active principles that enable us to judge, reach resolutions, act, and govern ourselves.22 
Winkler’s reading draws on themes from Soliloquy, where the nobler self takes an active 
guiding role:  
 
We hope also that our Patient (for such we naturally suppose our Reader) will consider duly 
with himself, that what he endures in this Operation is for no inconsiderable End: since 
’tis to gain him a Will, and insure him a certain Resolution; by which he shall know where to 
find himself; be sure of his own Meaning and Design; and as to all his Desires, Opinions, 
and Inclinations, be warranted one and the same Person to day as yesterday, and to morrow 
as to day. (S I.2, 1:116; C 84) 
 
Although Winkler and Purviance both highlight the practical aspects of Shaftesbury’s 
view, Winkler adopts a more critical attitude. He asks whether Shaftesbury while turning away 
from speculative metaphysics has failed to properly engage with the metaphysical problem of 
personal identity.23 Winkler asks further whether the simplicity of self that is discussed in The 
Moralists24 (phase five) can be reconciled with the complexities of a still to be perfected self 
that is meant to be guided by our better or nobler self presented in Soliloquy (phase one).25 
Udo Thiel’s interpretation (2011, 177–180, 240–247) is in part a critical response to 
Winkler. Although Thiel acknowledges that “there is an obvious ‘ethical orientation’ in 
Shaftesbury’s account” (241), Thiel emphasizes the metaphysical aspects of Shaftesbury’s 
																																																						
22 See Winkler (2000, 9, 11, 14). 
23 See Winkler (2000, 5, 12). 
24 See Shaftesbury, M III.1, 2:196–198; C 300–302.  
25 See Winkler (2000, 12–14). 
 12 
view and argues that “the view that the soul is a simple and immaterial substance forms an 
essential part of Shaftesbury’s account of personal identity.” (241)26 Thiel’s interpretation 
focuses on The Moralists (phase five). According to Thiel, Shaftesbury—through the voice of 
Theocles—offers cosmological arguments for the existence of a universal mind of the 
world.27 In an attempt to illustrate the doctrine of a universal mind the discussion turns to the 
identity and individuation of persons. Thiel summarizes, “[q]uite unlike Locke, Shaftesbury 
falls back on the notion of a simple mind as that which guarantees personal identity through 
time.” (245)  
 So far we have seen that the answers to the question to what extent Shaftesbury’s 
approach to persons and personal is moral or metaphysical divide interpreters. However, are 
the proposals genuinely competing interpretations or can they be reconciled? In support of 
the latter Laurent Jaffro (2014) argues that in Shaftesbury metaphysical questions of personal 
identity are directly connected with what Jaffro calls “normative identity”: 
 
I suggest that we differentiate between a normative sense of ‘being oneself’ or ‘remaining 
the same person’, and the metaphysical sense, that is, personal identity. The normative 
sense is that of constancy of the will: under favourable conditions, I do now just what I 
have decided to do, and I will do tomorrow what I decide now. If I suffer from weakness 
of will, then I am not always myself in the normative sense of being myself, although I am 
myself in the metaphysical sense: I do not lose my personal identity. … Shaftesbury 
directly connects personal identity and normative identity. (2014, 158)  
 
Jaffro (2008, 153–154; 2014, 155–159) offers a helpful elucidation of Shaftesbury’s 
conception of the will. Shaftesbury develops a Stoic intellectualist position, according to 
which the will is intelligent or rational. This means that when we are faced with a choice 
between two options, say A and B, and we believe that A is better than B, then—in so far as 
we are rational—we must always choose A. According to Jaffro, “for Shaftesbury the 
ultimate basis of moral identity, constancy, or integrity lies in our access to the permanence 
and stability of truth. … If we do not do our best to have true evaluative judgements then we 
will lack normative identity.” (2014, 158)  
																																																						
26 Thiel does not engage with Purviance’s interpretation, but I take it that he would disagree 
with her claim that Shaftesbury’s view is “moral, not metaphysical” (2004, 161; 2006, 58). 
27 See Shaftesbury, M II.4, III.1. 
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To return to the first of our three questions, I believe that Thiel and Jaffro are right that 
metaphysical themes are relevant for understanding Shaftesbury’s approach to persons and 
personal identity. Purviance offers an insightful understanding of the ethical and practical 
phases of Shaftesbury’s approach, but neglects that ethical perfection for Shaftesbury 
involves, or strives towards, understanding our place in the order of the universe (phase five) 
and thus a moral life will eventually lead to metaphysical reflections. For this reason, ethics 
cannot be sharply separated from metaphysics in Shaftesbury’s philosophy and we should 
reject a purely “moral, not metaphysical” interpretation of Shaftesbury’s approach to self as 
proposed by Purviance.28  
The further question is whether Shaftesbury’s contribution to debates about personal 
identity is simply a traditional immaterial substance view, as Thiel argues, or whether 
Shaftesbury connects metaphysical questions of personal identity with normative or ethical 
questions, as Jaffro proposes. As we have seen (during phase five) Theocles and Philocles 
agree that a self is a substance (M III.1, 2:197–198; C 301–302). In his Miscellaneous Reflections, 
after having questioned metaphysical debates about personal identity, including the Lockean 
proposal to understand personal identity in terms of consciousness, Shaftesbury “declare[s] 
that for my own part, I take my Being upon Trust.” (MR IV.1, 3:118; C 421) These passages 
intimate that Shaftesbury accepts that a self is a substance and that he takes our continued 
existence for granted. It is not far to infer that in response to the metaphysical question of 
what makes a person the same over time, Shaftesbury would be willing to accept that a 
person continues to exist in virtue of the continued existence of an underlying substance.  
Yet he makes clear that if we purely focus on the metaphysical questions we will “be at a 
loss still about [ourselves]” (M III.1, 2:199; C 302). For Shaftesbury we take our continued 
existence for granted, because this presupposition enables us to be devoted to ethics and 
practical matters. We find evidence for this both in The Moralists and in Miscellaneous Reflections. 
After the metaphysical remarks (discussed in the previous paragraph) Shaftesbury quickly 
returns to moral and practical issues and he emphasizes the active governing role of minds or 
persons: 
 
And of this Mind ’tis enough to say, ‘‘… That it superintends and manages its own 
Imaginations, Appearances, Fancys; correcting, working, and modelling these, as it finds good; 
																																																						
28 Yet Shaftesbury can still be said to be critical of purely speculative metaphysics, or “super-
speculative philosophy” (S III.1, 1:181; C 131), namely metaphysical questions that are 
entirely unconnected with questions of happiness and the good.  
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and adorning and accomplishing, the best it can, this composite Order of Body and 
Understanding.’’ Such a MIND and governing Part, I know there is somewhere in the 
World. (M III.1, 2:199; C 302) 
 
Mean while, there is no Impediment, Hinderance, or Suspension of Action, on account of 
these wonderfully refin’d Speculations. Argument and Debate go on still. Conduct is settled. 
Rules and Measures are given out, and receiv’d. Nor do we scruple to act as resolutely 
upon the mere Supposition that we are, as if we had effectually prov’d it a thousand times, 
to the full satisfaction of our Metaphysical or Pyrrhonean Antagonist.  
This to me appears sufficient Ground for a Moralist. Nor do I ask more, when I 
undertake to prove the reality of VIRTUE and MORALS.  (MR IV.1, 3:119; C 421) 
 
The fact that Shaftesbury immediately moves from metaphysical discussions concerning 
the ontological status of persons to ethics and practical questions of self-government, gives a 
hint that Shaftesbury considers metaphysical questions of personal identity as closely 
connected with ethical or practical questions, as Jaffro argues. Moreover the passage from 
Soliloquy I.2, 1:116 (C 84), cited above in support of Winkler’s interpretation, shows that the 
will by playing an active governing role, ensures that one is the same person over time. 29 This 
means for Shaftesbury there is not merely an underlying substance that grounds personal 
identity, but we play an active role in developing our character and creating the person who 
we are. 
The picture that has emerged so far is that Shaftesbury accepts the existence of an 
underlying substance and that he takes the continued existence of persons for granted. If 
asked the traditional metaphysical question of what makes a person the same over time, he 
will likely respond that a person continues to exist in virtue of the continued existence of the 
underlying substance. However, we can expect that he will add that this view is incomplete 
and needs to be supplemented. Persons are not just empty vessels, but rather persons have a 
will, can act, and have a particular character, and as persons we should focus on developing a 
																																																						
29 Additional textual support that for Shaftesbury metaphysical questions of personal identity 
are connected with ethical and practical questions can be found in his criticism and response 
to the Cartesian cogito and a Lockean account of personal identity. See Shaftesbury S III.1, 
1:176; C127; MR IV.1, 2:118; C 420–421. Had Shaftesbury meant to separate metaphysical 
questions of personal identity from ethical and practical questions he should have criticized 
the Lockean account of personal identity by arguing for a substance account of personal 
identity. Instead Shaftesbury aims to overcome the shortcomings of the Lockean view by 
drawing attention to the importance of developing a stable character.  
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stable moral character. This suggests that Shaftesbury would find it alienating to talk about 
persons as substances without also considering the character that is realized by the substance.  
Jaffro proposes that for Shaftesbury personal identity in the metaphysical sense is directly 
connected with what he calls normative identity. Is normative identity in Jaffro’s sense the 
same as the developmental dimension that I outlined above? I believe that my interpretation 
has the potential to challenge Jaffro’s understanding of normative selfhood. According to 
Jaffro, normative selfhood, which is realized by true normative judgements, or at least aims 
towards truth, is a “very ambitious conception of selfhood” (2014, 159), because only highly 
intellectual and rational individuals are capable of achieving it. However, does the 
developmental approach require that in order to be a self or person one must have already 
reached a state of intellectual perfection?  
In contrast to Jaffro’s interpretation, my developmental approach makes it possible to 
regard moral improvement and character development as an ongoing project of life. My 
interpretation focuses on the process of striving towards perfection, rather than a state of 
intellectual perfection. We have seen that phases three and five are intellectually very 
demanding and that not everyone is able to reach them. Jaffro’s interpretation excludes those 
who have not yet reached a deep understanding of moral truth. This means it excludes those 
who have not yet reached phases three and five. My developmental interpretation does not 
have this consequence and includes as persons everyone who is on an intellectual journey 
anywhere between phases one through five (and possibly in a different order).  A 
developmental interpretation can take seriously Shaftesbury’s view that philosophy is meant 
to be practical. The inner dialogue form of Soliloquy strengthens the invitation to the reader to 
enter into an inner dialogue with oneself, to listen to the advice of one’s better self with the 
aim of improving one’s character and achieving moral integrity. Shaftesbury is aware that this 
can be a long and difficult process. Rather than being fixated on an intellectual state of 
perfection, Soliloquy focuses on the intellectual and developmental journey. In this sense 
Shaftesbury’s philosophy is practical. Similarly, the dialogue form of The Moralists offers 
support for a developmental interpretation. Theocles represents an elite character who is 
close to reaching highest intellectual perfection. Yet Philocles reminds us of the struggles of 
such an intellectual journey. It is precisely the back and forth between Philocles and Theocles, 
between mundane and intellectual views, that turns the project of seeking moral integrity and 
happiness into a developmental one. 
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4. Shaftesbury’s significance  
 
Has Shaftesbury advanced debates about persons and personal identity? In the interest of 
philosophical clarity one may prefer to separate the metaphysical question of personal 
identity, namely the question of what the necessary and sufficient conditions are that make a 
person the same over time, from moral or normative questions of character development. 
Anyone who favours such a distinction is likely to be disappointed by the lack of originality of 
Shaftesbury’s contributions to the former question. The textual evidence, however, suggests 
that Shaftesbury sees the two questions more closely connected. It may be fair to say that 
Shaftesbury does not solely address the traditional problem of personal identity and thus has 
shifted the discourse. Certainly, he has supplemented the metaphysical questions. For him the 
insight that “I AM” will prompt us to turn to the normative question “WHO and WHAT I ought 
to be” (MR IV.1, 3:119; C 421). I suggested that for Shaftesbury the underlying metaphysics of 
persons and personal identity is supplemented by a developmental project, which invites 
persons to enter an intellectual journey and to strive to improve their character, to seek 
happiness, and to understand their place in the order of the universe.  
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